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I.   INTRODUCTION
The right to the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right
guaranteed to all criminal defendants. The Sixth Amendment pro-
vides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”1 The
Florida Constitution also provides this right to defendants.2 The
right has been alternatively recognized as the “right to counsel”3 and
                                                                                                                 
* Lieutenant, JAGC, U.S. Navy. The author thanks his wife, Julie, for her encour-
agement and patience, and Professor John Yetter, who taught him about criminal proce-
dure and provided the inspiration for this Comment.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(a) (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . shall
have the right . . . to be heard in person, by counsel or both . . . .”).
3. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963).
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as the “right to assistance of counsel.”4 This Comment uses these
terms interchangeably. Irrespective of the terminology, courts have
long recognized that:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the in-
telligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge ade-
quately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.5
The right to counsel granted by the U.S. Constitution is an
evolving concept. Commentators have asserted that “[d]uring the
past half century, Supreme Court decisions have transformed the
Sixth Amendment’s ‘Assistance of Counsel’ clause from a simple
guarantor of the aid of retained counsel at trial into a requirement
that counsel be available to protect the defendant’s interests in an
ever expanding variety of pre-trial contexts.”6 Part II of this Com-
ment examines the right to counsel as it has evolved under the U.S.
Constitution and the Florida Constitution. Part III reviews and
analyzes the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Traylor v. State7
and subsequent decisions in Florida courts, and compares them with
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court relating to the right to
counsel. Parts IV and V discuss the effect of equivocal invocations of
Miranda rights in light of recent Florida and U.S. Supreme Court
cases. Part VI analyzes the impact of Florida’s right to counsel juris-
prudence on various longstanding law enforcement methods. Fi-
nally, Part VII recommends a modification to the Florida Supreme
Court’s approach that will avoid interference with these longstand-
ing methods of law enforcement.
                                                                                                                 
4. Id. at 339.
5. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). Powell was the first major Su-
preme Court discussion of the right to counsel. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1(a), at 519 (2d ed. 1992). Though not specifically
grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the decision has significantly influ-
enced the Court’s right-to-counsel jurisprudence. See id.; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to ap-
pointed counsel, as well as the right to retained counsel); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-44
(extending the right to appointed counsel in state cases to all indigent felony defen-
dants).
6. E.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE MASSIAH  LINE OF
CASES 4-5 (1986).
7. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
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II.   LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.   Comparison of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights to
Counsel
Although the Sixth Amendment expressly grants criminal defen-
dants the right to the assistance of counsel, a similar right is also
derived from other constitutional guarantees. In Miranda v. Ari-
zona,8 the U.S. Supreme Court found that the right to consult with
counsel was indispensable to the right against self-incrimination
protected by the Fifth Amendment.9 Police are required to inform a
person subjected to custodial interrogation10 that “he has the right to
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during inter-
rogation.”11 Although the Court’s language in Miranda seemed to
imply that the warnings had a constitutional nexus, the Court later
retreated from such a holding. In Michigan v. Tucker ,12 the Court
indicated that procedural safeguards were not constitutionally man-
dated.13
The Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel have essen-
tially different purposes. The Fifth Amendment right is designed to
protect the suspect from self-incrimination. “It is not, therefore, ac-
tually a right to a lawyer in particular, but rather the right to have
                                                                                                                 
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. See id. at 469.
10. The Miranda Court defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444. The custody prong is deter-
mined using an objective standard that asks whether a reasonable person would have un-
derstood that his or her freedom of action was restricted to a “degree associated with for-
mal arrest” and that he or she was not free to leave. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
440 (1984).
11. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. The Court found that “[a] mere warning given by the
interrogators” is insufficient because “[e]ven advice given to the accused by his own attor-
ney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process.” Id. at 469-70. Rather, the
accused is entitled to have an attorney present during the interrogation. See id. at 470.
12. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
13. See id. at 444. The Court discussed the Miranda warnings and explained:
[T]hese procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against com-
pulsory self-incrimination was protected. . . . The suggested safeguards were
not intended to “create a constitutional straitjacket,” but rather to provide
practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.
Id. (citation omitted). This rejection of a constitutional nexus for the Miranda warnings is
paradoxical. The Court had previously found that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
self-incrimination was a fundamental right made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Although the Miranda
Court held that the rule was not grounded in the Fifth Amendment, it nonetheless made
use of the warnings mandatory for the states. See 384 U.S. at 490. Without some constitu-
tional basis for the rules, however, they could not be made applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 5, § 6.5(e), at 317.
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good advice during police interrogation so the privilege against self-
incrimination will not be unwittingly surrendered.”14 When a sus-
pect has properly invoked the prophylactic Fifth Amendment right
to counsel,15 all interrogation must cease.16 Thereafter, only the ac-
cused may initiate further communication unless counsel is physi-
cally present.17 The rule relates to all interrogation on any offense.
This rule, frequently referred to as the Edwards rule,18 is harsh.
Violation of the standard results in the exclusion of any communi-
cation.19 If the suspect
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police
may not question him.20
                                                                                                                 
14. Craig R. Johnson, Note, McNeil v. Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial
Interrogation, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1643, 1658.
15. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (“[P]rohibition on further
questioning . . . is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on coerced con-
fessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose.”).
16. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 (“[T]he individual must have an opportunity to con-
fer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.”).
17. See id. Police may resume questioning after a suspect invokes the right to remain
silent as long as interrogators “scrupulously honor” the suspect’s right to cut off question-
ing. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975) (finding that the suspect’s right was
scrupulously honored where the subsequent questioning was initiated by a different offi-
cer, concerned an unrelated offense, and took place more than two hours after the initial
interrogation). Conversely, following invocation of the Miranda right to counsel, police
may not initiate any interrogation without counsel present. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 484 (1981) (“[A]n accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until coun-
sel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communi-
cations, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”).
18. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994). The Edwards rule
was derived from Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which expanded the scope of
Miranda by requiring law enforcement officers to immediately cease interrogation when
an accused has clearly asserted the right to have counsel present during the interrogation.
See id. at 485.
19. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979). The Court justified this harsh-
ness by stating:
[T]his relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease upon the ac-
cused’s request for an attorney . . . has the virtue of informing police and prose-
cutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interro-
gation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained
during such interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity . . . has
been thought to outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes on
law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of
trustworthy and highly probative evidence.
Id.
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
1997]                         RIGHT TO COUNSEL 635
The Miranda Court explained that these guidelines apply, however,
only to custodial interrogation.21
Unlike the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the Sixth
Amendment right is “offense specific.”22 The right attaches at the
initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings “by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraign-
ment.”23 No invocation of the right need be made by the accused.24
Once the Sixth Amendment right has attached, police may not
“deliberately elicit”25 incriminating statements from the accused
outside the presence of counsel without an effective waiver.26 Ad-
ditionally, once the right has attached, the prosecution may not
initiate any critical confrontation with the accused outside the
presence of counsel.27
The Supreme Court and various commentators have noted that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is both narrower and
broader than its Fifth Amendment counterpart.28 The Sixth
Amendment is narrower in that it attaches only after the initiation
of judicial proceedings,29 while the Fifth Amendment applies to all
custodial interrogation. However, the Sixth Amendment is broader
in that it applies to situations outside of custodial interrogation, to
which the Fifth Amendment right is limited.30 In fact, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel extends to all “critical stages” of the
                                                                                                                 
21. See id. at 477-78; see also supra note 10. Interrogation refers to express action or
questioning by a state agent that a reasonable person would conclude is designed to elicit
an incriminating response. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). Thus,
custodial interrogation is based upon the perception of the accused. See id.
22. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). Invocation of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel does not prohibit police from interrogating the suspect regarding
crimes with which he or she has not yet been charged. See id. (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right “cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach
until a prosecution is commenced”). The Fifth Amendment right to counsel, by comparison,
protects the suspect against any custodial interrogation and thus is not offense-specific.
See id. at 178.
23. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). The Court explained that a person is
entitled to counsel once “the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidi-
fied.” Id.
24. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
25. Massiah v. United States, 317 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964) (holding that statements
deliberately elicited in the absence of counsel violated the Sixth Amendment).
26. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (“[A] heavy burden rests on the government to dem-
onstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.”).
27. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (holding that the absence of
counsel at a post-indictment lineup violated the Sixth Amendment).
28. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991); see also, e.g., Rick Madden &
Cheryl M. Miller, Project: Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J. 1007, 1009-10 (1994).
29. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984).
30. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429 (1986).
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criminal proceedings and to all “crucial confrontations” between
the accused and the forces of the State.31
B.   Critical Stages and Crucial Confrontations
In United States v. Wade ,32 the Court set forth the standard for
identifying critical stages in the judicial process. The Court stated
that the existence of a critical stage depended upon an analysis of
“whether potential substantial prejudice to [the] defendant’s rights
inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to
help avoid that prejudice.”33 Thus, the Court held that a defendant’s
right to counsel may extend to proceedings outside the actual trial,
including every stage at which the accused’s rights may be impeded
by the absence of counsel.34 In addition to its decision in Wade, the
Court has held that critical stages of the prosecution include ar-
raignment,35 preliminary hearings,36 post-indictment interroga-
tion,37 and other pretrial confrontations.38
Since Wade, the Court has explained that only events occurring
after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings may comprise
a critical stage.39 The Court has also clarified that the defendant
must be physically present and confronted by the prosecution for
a critical stage to exist.40 In such situations, the results of the
                                                                                                                 
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Wade involved the use of a post-indictment lineup con-
ducted for the purpose of identification without notice to the accused’s counsel. See id.
at 220.
33. Id. at 227.
34. See id. at 226.
35. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961). Arraignment is the “[p]rocedure
whereby the accused is brought before the court to plead to the criminal charges against
him in the indictment or information.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (6th ed. 1990). Ac-
cordingly, it necessarily occurs only after the initiation of adversary judicial proceed-
ings.
36. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1970).
37. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977).
38. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1980) (finding that post-
indictment statements deliberately elicited by an undercover inmate outside the presence
of counsel violated the Sixth Amendment).
39. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (holding that a pre-indictment
lineup did not constitute a critical stage because the right to counsel had not yet attached).
40. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973) (holding that counsel need not
be present when police show photographs of the defendant and others to witnesses, even
when the defendant has already been indicted); cf. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 (concluding
that a post-indictment lineup raises concerns because lineups are “riddled with innu-
merable dangers and variable factors” that can only be prevented by counsel’s pres-
ence).
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confrontation might well determine the outcome of the actual
trial.41
C.   The Florida Constitution
The Florida Constitution’s Declaration of Rights specifies those
actions the State may not take against its citizens.42 These rights are
considered “so basic that the framers of our Constitution accorded
them a place of special privilege” at the beginning of the document.43
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution sets forth the equiva-
lent of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination,44 providing in relevant part that “[n]o person shall . . .
be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against him-
self.”45 Similarly, article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution sets
forth the equivalent of the U.S. Constitution’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, providing that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused . . . shall have the right . . . to be heard in person, by counsel
or both . . . .”46
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that states may
adopt additional protections and rights as long as they do not violate
any federal constitutional provision.47 In fact, every state constitu-
tion includes either internal provisions designed to protect indi-
viduals’ rights or a separate declaration of rights.48 Before most of
the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights were made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, state constitu-
tions were the only guarantors of these fundamental rights.49
In interpreting their state constitutions, state courts are not gen-
erally bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of equiva-
lent provisions of the U.S. Constitution.50 While some states have
adopted a strong mirroring presumption or require an interpretation
                                                                                                                 
41. The Wade Court recognized that “today’s law enforcement machinery involves
critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the
results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”
388 U.S. at 224.
42. See FLA. CONST. art. I.
43. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 963 (Fla. 1992).
44. Compare FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (preserving right against self-incrimination) with
U.S. CONST. amend. V (same).
45. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
46. Id. art. I, § 16(a).
47. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
48. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 5, § 2.10(a), at 93.
49. See id.
50. See id. § 2.10(a), at 95 (“In many instances, the state courts have adopted the rea-
soning urged by dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court. In others, state courts have
adopted a quite different analytical mode for a particular guarantee . . . .”).
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consistent with that of the U.S. Supreme Court,51 many state courts
have adopted an independent approach,52 treating the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court as no more persuasive than the reasoning
existing therein.53
III.   THE TRAYLOR DECISION
A.   The Factual Situation
John Traylor was charged by information with the June 11, 1980,
murder of Tina Nagy in Jacksonville, Florida.54 Two months later,
Traylor was arrested by Alabama authorities for the August 5, 1980,
murder of Debra Beacon in Birmingham, Alabama.55 Alabama police
ran a computer check of Traylor’s fingerprints and discovered that
he was wanted in Florida for the earlier murder.56 Traylor requested
and received the appointment of legal counsel for the Alabama
charge on August 18, 1980.57 Traylor’s counsel advised him not to
speak with police and directed Alabama police not to talk to Tray-
lor.58 On August 22, a Jacksonville detective flew to Birmingham to
question Traylor about the Florida murder.59 The detective was
never advised that counsel had been appointed for the Alabama
charge and, after obtaining a written Miranda waiver, began to in-
terrogate Traylor about both murders.60 During this interrogation,
the suspect confessed to both murders.61 Traylor was tried and con-
victed of second-degree murder in Alabama, then temporarily re-
turned to Florida in March 1983, where he was charged by indict-
ment with first-degree murder for the Florida crime.62
Prior to trial in Florida, Traylor’s counsel sought to suppress both
August 22 confessions.63 He claimed that the confessions were ob-
tained in violation of Traylor’s right against self-incrimination and
right to counsel under the constitutions of both Florida and the
                                                                                                                 
51. See id. § 2.10(c), at 99. Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution expressly
states that its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is to be “construed
in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court.” FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
52. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 5, § 2.10(c), at 100.
53. See id.
54. See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1992).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. Florida police desired to use evidence of the Alabama murder as “similar
fact” evidence in the Florida murder trial. See id. at 960 n.1.
61. See id. at 960.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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United States.64 The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and
the jury found Traylor guilty of second-degree murder.65 On appeal,
the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) affirmed, concluding
that although the trial court had erred in admitting the Alabama
confession because it was obtained outside the presence of counsel
after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached and was
invoked, the error was harmless “in light of other overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt.”66 In addition, the First DCA found that Traylor’s
right to counsel for the Florida murder charge had attached at the
time of charging by information, but that counsel had neither been
requested nor appointed for that charge.67 Furthermore, the First
DCA found that the Florida confession was also unlawfully obtained
because the Miranda warning preceding the detective’s interroga-
tion was insufficient to inform Traylor of his Sixth Amendment
right.68 Nevertheless, the First DCA concluded that use of this con-
fession also was harmless error.69
B.   Federalism
Traylor appealed the First DCA’s decision to the Florida Supreme
Court. The supreme court began its decision with a discussion of
federalism.70 The court recognized that the purposes of the federal
and state constitutions are different: “[S]tates may place more rigor-
ous restraints on government intrusion than the federal charter im-
poses; they may not, however, place more restrictions on the funda-
mental rights of their citizens than the federal Constitution per-
mits.”71 This approach permits states to experiment with the devel-
opment of alternative methods of constitutional analysis.72
C.   Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Traylor court next discussed the conflict between the state’s
desire to curb criminal activity and the need to protect a defendant’s
right against self-incrimination.73 The court recognized the “unqualified
good” of the state’s authority to acquire voluntary confessions.74
                                                                                                                 
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 961.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 962. For a discussion of state courts’ divergent interpretation of their
respective state constitutions, see supra Part II.C.
73. See 596 So. 2d at 964.
74. Id. at 965.
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The court’s application of  the Florida Constitution’s right against
self-incrimination to Traylor’s factual situation closely paralleled the
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the same right under the
Fifth Amendment. The court reiterated that the Florida Constitu-
tion required that the warnings set forth in Miranda be provided to
suspects to ensure confessions are made voluntarily.75 The court
then discussed the degree of specificity necessary to invoke Miranda
rights. “Under Section 9, if the suspect indicates in any manner that
he or she does not want to be interrogated, interrogation must not
begin or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop.”76
D.   Right to Counsel
Following discussion of the right against self-incrimination, the
court addressed the right to counsel under article I, section 16 of the
Florida Constitution.77 The court concluded that “for this right to
have meaning, it must apply at least at each crucial stage78 of the
prosecution.”79 The court defined a crucial stage as any stage that
“may significantly affect the outcome of the proceedings.”80 The court
further held that the right to counsel in Florida was “charge-
specific”81 as opposed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s description of the
Sixth Amendment right as “offense specific.”82
The court next discussed the attachment of the article I, section
16 right to counsel. Beginning with a review of provisions in Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to assignment of counsel to
indigents, the court reasoned that the Florida Constitution’s equal
protection clause83 requires that identical treatment be provided to
nonindigents.84 An indigent may be appointed counsel “when the
person is formally charged with an offense, or as soon as feasible af-
ter custodial restraint, or at the first appearance before a commit-
ting magistrate,85 whichever occurs earliest.”86 In a footnote, the
                                                                                                                 
75. See id.
76. Id. at 966 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, §  9) (emphasis added).
77. See id.
78. Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies to each “critical stage” of the prosecution).
79. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 968.
80. Id.
81. Id. The term “charge-specific” refers to the rule that invocation of the right to
counsel as to one charge imposes no restriction on police inquiry as to separate charges for
which the section 16 right has not attached. See id.
82. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991); see also supra note 22.
83. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
84. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 970 (“[T]he procedural rights of nonindigents under
section 16 are at least coextensive with those of indigents.”).
85. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure require that an arrested individual be
brought before a magistrate within 24 hours of being detained. See FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.130(a). This “first appearance” generally occurs prior to indictment or the filing of formal
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court further explained that the assignment of counsel is generally
“feasible” by the time of booking.87
In giving effect to this earlier point for the attachment of the
right to counsel, the court referenced the American Bar Association
(ABA) standard upon which the Rules of Criminal Procedure were
based.88 The commentary to the ABA standard provides, in relevant
part:
This standard, however, extends beyond the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions, for it applies to situations that have not been held to be
“critical stages” within the meaning of the sixth amendment. Thus,
the standard recommends that counsel be provided “as soon as
feasible after custody begins,” assuming that this event occurs, as
it usually does, prior to the defendant’s appearance before a judi-
cial officer or the filing of formal charges.89
E.   Application to the Factual Situation
In applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Traylor
court began by addressing the self-incrimination issue. The court
rejected Traylor’s contention that the confessions were obtained in
violation of his article I, section 9 right against self-incrimination.90
The court found that Traylor’s attorney had attempted to invoke
Traylor’s right against self-incrimination by directing the police not
to question his client.91 However, the court also found that there was
competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Traylor
had never personally invoked this privilege.92 In fact, the court found
that Traylor had executed a valid waiver of his article I, section 9
right, and that his admissions of guilt in both the Jacksonville and
Birmingham homicides were voluntary.93
                                                                                                                 
charges, and thus would constitute an earlier attachment of the right to counsel than is
provided by the Sixth Amendment.
86. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(a).
87. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 970 n.38. Booking is an “[a]dministrative step taken after
an arrested person is brought to the police station, which involves entry of the person’s
name, the crime for which the arrest was made, and other relevant facts on the police
‘blotter.’ ” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (6th ed. 1990).
88. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 970.
89. Id. at 970 n.42 (quoting 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 5-5.1 (1980)).
90. See id. at 970-71.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 971. The court found that there was competent substantial evidence to
support the finding that the request did not result from any communication between
Traylor and his counsel, but rather from defense counsel’s routine request that the police
refrain from interrogating his clients. See id. This finding is troublesome. Because Traylor
met with his counsel before the police interrogation, it is possible that Traylor requested
his counsel to invoke his privilege. Such a communication between the lawyer and client
would be protected. See id. at 975-79 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. See id. at 971.
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Turning to Traylor’s claim that the confessions were obtained in
violation of his article I, section 16 right to counsel, the court agreed
with Traylor in part, finding that because Traylor had been ar-
rested, charged with the Alabama offense, and had counsel ap-
pointed at his preliminary hearing, the Florida right to counsel had
attached.94 “Because Traylor subsequently requested counsel at the
preliminary hearing and a lawyer was appointed, Florida police
were constitutionally barred from initiating any crucial confronta-
tion with him on that charge in the absence of his lawyer for use in a
Florida court.”95 As to the Florida offense, however, the court found
that although Traylor’s article I, section 16 right to counsel had at-
tached when he was charged by information on June 11, Traylor had
not retained or requested the appointment of counsel on that charge
when Florida police obtained his confession.96 The court held that
the notice provided to Traylor as part of his Miranda warnings was
sufficient to satisfy his article I, section 16 right to counsel.97 Finally,
the court concluded that although the trial court had erred in ad-
mitting Traylor’s confession to the Alabama murder, that error was
harmless.98 Accordingly, the court affirmed Traylor’s conviction for
second-degree murder.99
F.   Justice Barkett’s Opinion
Justice Barkett wrote separately, taking issue with the majority’s
application of the law to the facts of the case.100 Justice Barkett be-
lieved that Traylor had invoked his right to counsel for all purposes
through his request for counsel at the Alabama first-appearance
hearing, thereby barring state-initiated custodial questioning on any
matter.101 In her analysis, Justice Barkett cited Patterson v. Illi-
nois102 for its implicit holding that “[w]hen an accused invokes the
right to a lawyer by requesting counsel, the request is for all pur-
poses for which he or she is entitled to a lawyer.”103 Justice Barkett
would have held that because the article I, section 16 right to coun-
                                                                                                                 
94. See id. at 972.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 972-73.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 974-75 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. See id. at 974.
102. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
103. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 974 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Patterson, 487 U.S. at 300). In Patterson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that warn-
ings provided by law enforcement personnel under Miranda suffice to advise an accused of
both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. See 487 U.S. at 293. Furthermore,
waiver of the right pursuant to Miranda constitutes waiver of the right under both provi-
sions. See id. at 300.
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sel was invoked at Traylor’s first appearance, his article I, section 9
right to counsel was invoked simultaneously.104 Accordingly, because
the article I, section 9 right to counsel is not charge-specific, law en-
forcement personnel were precluded from initiating questioning on
any charge after that point, and the trial court committed error in
admitting the Florida confession.105 Nevertheless, Justice Barkett
concurred in the result because the admission of this confession was
harmless in light of the other evidence against Traylor.106
G.   Justice Kogan’s Opinion
Justice Kogan also wrote separately, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part.107 The portion of the majority opinion with which
Justice Kogan took issue concerned the ability of an attorney to in-
voke a client’s constitutional right to counsel.108 Justice Kogan ar-
gued that because the trial court’s factual findings indicated that the
defense attorney had met and spoken with Traylor prior to directing
police to refrain from interrogation, the attorney was able to satis-
factorily invoke Traylor’s right to counsel.109 Because any communi-
cations between Traylor and his defense counsel were privileged,
and thus beyond the knowledge of the state, the direction conveyed
by the attorney to law enforcement personnel presumptively re-
flected Traylor’s own desire to invoke his right to counsel.110
IV.   EQUIVOCAL INVOCATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
A.   The Florida Approach:  Owen v. State (Owen I)
One issue that had been left unresolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court’s right against self-incrimination and right to counsel juris-
prudence was the degree of clarity necessary to invoke either of
these rights. What degree of specificity is required for a suspect to
properly invoke the protections afforded by the rights to counsel? Be-
fore the U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue in Davis v.
United States,111 the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue in
                                                                                                                 
104. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 974-75 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 975.
107. See id. at 975-85 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 976.
110. See id. at 975.
111. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994). For a discussion of Davis, see infra Part IV.C.
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Owen v. State (Owen I ).112 During Owen’s interrogation, law en-
forcement officers obtained confessions to a series of crimes.113 The
interrogation followed an established pattern. Police presented their
evidence for each crime and attempted to persuade Owen that they
had the proof necessary to convict him.114
After several sessions following this routine, police continued to
interrogate Owen after he responded to a question with the equivo-
cal statement, “I’d rather not talk about it.”115 Instead of attempting
to clarify the suspect’s desire, the police urged Owen to explain.116 “I
don’t want to talk about it,” he replied, and police again pressed him
to talk.117 At trial, Owen moved to suppress the incriminating re-
sponses elicited after his equivocal statement.118 The trial judge, af-
ter initially indicating that the continued questioning was a clear
violation of Miranda, concluded the responses were not an invoca-
tion of Owen’s rights.119 Owen was subsequently convicted and sen-
tenced to death.120
On direct appeal,121 a divided Florida Supreme Court concluded
that Owen’s statements were, “at the least, an equivocal invocation
of the Miranda right to terminate questioning, which could only be
clarified.”122 The majority concluded that police had a duty to clarify
the suspect’s desires before continuing the interrogation.123 Justice
Barkett, in a concurrence joined by Justice Kogan, indicated her be-
lief that Miranda required interrogation to cease when the individ-
ual invoked his or her rights “ ‘in any manner, at any time prior to
or during questioning.’ ”124 Justice Grimes, in a dissenting opinion,
indicated his belief that existing case law did not require police to
discontinue interrogation absent a clear invocation of the suspect’s
Miranda rights.125 Taken together, the three approaches contem-
                                                                                                                 
112. 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990). The state would request reconsideration of the issue in
light of Davis in State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 662 So. 2d
933 (Fla. 1995) (Owen II ). See infra text accompanying notes 182-89.
113. See Owen I, 560 So. 2d at 209.
114. See id. at 210.
115. Id. at 211.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 209.
121. The Florida Constitution provides that the Supreme Court “[s]hall hear appeals
from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty.” FLA. CONST. art. V, §
3(b)(1). Such appeals bypass the district courts of appeal.
122. Owen I, 560 So. 2d at 211. Although Owen I referred to the provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, the Traylor court reaffirmed the Owen I holding as it related to the article I,
section 9 right against self-incrimination. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 966.
123. See Owen I, 560 So. 2d at 211.
124. Id. at 213 (Barkett, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384
U.S. at 473-74).
125. See id. at 213 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
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plated by the Owen I court cover the spectrum of options available
to courts.
B.   Judicial Approaches to the Problem of Equiv ocal Invocation
1.   The Per Se Bar Approach
In Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to provide express
guidance for law enforcement personnel and courts evaluating the
admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation.126
The Court held that questioning must immediately cease if suspects
indicate “in any manner” that they wish to discontinue the interro-
gation or consult with counsel.127 Arguably, this language requires
interrogators to discontinue questioning in response to a suspect’s
mere mention of counsel.128 Such a per se bar sets forth a bright-line
rule requiring no guesswork by police officers. Opponents of this per
se bar argue that it prevents police from questioning a suspect in the
absence of counsel even when the suspect does not desire to have
counsel present.129 The suspect’s mere mention of counsel during the
interrogation would have the effect of interfering with the suspect’s
actual desires. Despite its reasonableness in light of the Miranda “in
any manner” language, only a minority of courts have adopted this
approach.130
2.   The Clarification Approach
A majority of state and lower federal courts follow what has be-
come known as the clarification approach.131 Applying this standard,
when a suspect makes an ambiguous reference to counsel, law en-
                                                                                                                 
126. See 384 U.S. at 444-45, 467-79.
127. See id. at 444-45.
128. See Nancy M. Kennelly, Note, Davis v. United States: The Supreme Court Rejects
a Third Layer of Prophylaxis, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 589, 597-98 (1995).
129. See, e.g., John J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in
Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 1010 (1986). The Supreme Court has reached
this same conclusion. See Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994) (concluding
that the per se bar would “transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obsta-
cles to legitimate investigative activity because it would needlessly prevent the police from
questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel, even if the suspect does not wish to have a
lawyer present”).
130. See, e.g., Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978); People v. Superior
Court, 542 P.2d 1390, 1395 (Cal. 1975); see also Tom Chen, Note, Davis v. United States:
“Maybe I Should Talk to a Lawyer” Means Maybe Miranda Is Unraveling, 23 PEPP. L. REV.
607, 618 (1996).
131. See, e.g., United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 461 (10th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v.
D’Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975
(2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Porter, 776 F.2d 370, 370 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517
(5th Cir. 1979) (en banc); United States v. Riggs, 537 F.2d 1219, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976).
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forcement officers are required to immediately cease substantive
questioning and only can proceed with clarifying questions to dis-
cern whether the suspect desires to consult with counsel. This ap-
proach has the advantage of resolving the ambiguity in accordance
with the suspect’s actual desires. The clarification approach also
permits courts to more readily determine whether the defendant in-
voked his or her Miranda rights. Opponents of the clarification ap-
proach, however, argue that it may permit interrogating officers to
circumvent the Edwards rule by coercion or intimidation.132 The
Florida Supreme Court, like most other courts that have addressed
the issue, adopted the clarification approach in Owen I.133
3.   The Threshold Standard of Clarity Approach
The least common of the three approaches to ambiguous invoca-
tion of Miranda rights is the threshold standard of clarity ap-
proach.134 This approach permits law enforcement officers to ignore
any ambiguous request for counsel. When a suspect’s utterance fails
to meet a certain threshold of clarity, the interrogator has no obli-
gation to clarify the suspect’s wishes or to cease questioning.135 The
threshold standard of clarity approach is based upon language in
Edwards that requires authorities to cease questioning a suspect “if
he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.”136 This approach per-
mits individual officers to use their subjective judgment as to
whether the right has been unambiguously invoked.137 Opponents of
this approach are concerned that it disadvantages suspects whose
exhaustion, intimidation, fear, or lack of adequate linguistic ability
might preclude the clear invocation of their rights.138 Such a result is
precisely what the Supreme Court sought to prevent by mandating
Miranda compliance.139 In view of the several conflicting approaches
in use, the legal community looked forward to the Court’s resolution
of the issue.
                                                                                                                 
132. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Power-
lessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 311-12 (1993) (arguing that both the
clarification and threshold standard of clarity approaches disadvantage women and mi-
norities, who are more likely to use less direct and assertive patterns of speech).
133. See 560 So. 2d at 211 (citing Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1987)).
134. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill. 1980); Bane v. State, 587
N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ind. 1992).
135. See Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994).
136. 451 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added).
137. See, e.g., Krueger, 412 N.E.2d at 540.
138. See Tomkovicz, supra note 129, at 1010; see also Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61
(Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter criticized the threshold standard of clarity rule as
“requiring criminal suspects to speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.” Id. at
2364.
139. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58.
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C.   The United States Supreme Court’s Subsequent Decision in
Davis v. United States
1.   The Majority Opinion
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court finally entered the discussion
when it decided Davis v. United States 140 and addressed the issue of
equivocal invocation of Miranda rights under the U.S. Constitution.
The majority opinion addressed the problem that arises when a sus-
pect makes an ambiguous reference to obtaining counsel during an
interrogation.141 Davis involved the case of a Navy seaman who had
been convicted of murder at a general court-martial.142 After a valid
Miranda waiver, followed by more than an hour and a half of inter-
rogation, Davis told investigators, “maybe I should talk to a law-
yer.”143 Naval investigators responded by ceasing substantive ques-
tioning and attempting to clarify Davis’s intent.144 In response to
clarification attempts, Davis indicated he did not want a lawyer.145
Davis urged the Court to adopt the per se bar approach, which
would require investigators to immediately cease interrogation when
a suspect makes any reference to obtaining counsel.146 The govern-
ment urged the Court to adopt the clarification approach, which
would require investigators to ask limited questions to clarify the
suspect’s desires.147
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor adopted the threshold
standard of clarity approach. The Court recognized the importance
of an objective standard for interrogating investigators to follow
when faced with an ambiguous reference to counsel.148 The Court
noted that although a suspect need not make a request with preci-
sion, “he must articulate his desire to have counsel present suffi-
ciently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”149
Although the majority opinion expressly recognized the propriety of
police clarification of the suspect’s desires, the Court declined to
make clarification mandatory.150 The Court explained:
                                                                                                                 
140. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
141. See id. at 2054.
142. See id. at 2053.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Petitioner’s Brief at 29-30, Davis (No. 92-1949). Because the investigators at-
tempted to clarify Davis’s desires with respect to his reference to counsel, advocating the
clarification approach would not have benefited Davis on appeal.
147. See Respondent’s Brief at 20, Davis (No. 92-1949); see also Davis, 114 S. Ct. at
2359 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring).
148. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 2356.
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Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal
statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing
officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney. . . .
But we decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying
questions. If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or
unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to
stop questioning him.151
2.   Justice Souter’s Concurrence
Although concurring in the result, Justice Souter, joined by three
other members of the Court, refused to conclude that investigators
were at liberty to ignore Davis’s reference to counsel.152 Instead,
Justice Souter believed that the investigators had an affirmative, le-
gal obligation to clarify the suspect’s ambiguous statement.153 Be-
cause the investigators stopped interrogation to clarify Davis’s de-
sires regarding counsel, Justice Souter concurred in the judgment
affirming Davis’s conviction based upon statements obtained after
the clarification.154 Grounding his opinion in fairness, practicality,
and in the judgments of the majority of the courts that had already
considered the issue, Justice Souter urged adoption of the clarifica-
tion approach.155
D.   Criticism of the Davis Decision
Numerous commentators have found fault with the Davis ap-
proach to ambiguous requests for counsel.156 The most common
criticism concerns the impact the threshold standard of clarity ap-
proach has on disadvantaged sections of society.157 In his concur-
rence in Davis, Justice Souter commented that:
[C]riminal suspects . . . “thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
run through menacing police interrogation procedures” would
seem an odd group to single out for the Court’s demand of height-
ened linguistic care. A substantial percentage of them lack any-
thing like a confident command of the English language, many are
                                                                                                                 
151. Id.
152. See id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter was joined in his opinion by
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg. See id. at 2358.
153. See id. at 2359.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., Scott M. Lang, Self Incrimination: It Now Takes a Law Degree to Know
How to Properly Invoke One’s Right to Counsel, 42 NAVAL L. REV. 145, 163 (1995); Samira
Sadeghi, Hung Up on Semantics: A Critique of Davis v. United States, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 313, 315-16 (1995); Chen, supra note 130, at 609; Kennelly, supra note 128, at
592.
157. See, e.g., Ainsworth, supra note 132, at 320.
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“woefully ignorant,” and many more will be sufficiently intimi-
dated by the interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncer-
tainty of their predicament that the ability to speak assertively
will abandon them.158
Another common criticism of the Davis decision is that the Court
has renounced the premise on which Miranda was founded.159 Mi-
randa was based on the presumption that all custodial interrogation
is by its nature inherently coercive.160 The Davis Court placed its
trust in the good faith of law enforcement officers.161 As the recent
O.J. Simpson murder trial demonstrated, blind trust in the good
faith of law enforcement officers may very well be misplaced.162
V.   THE FUTURE OF EQUIVOCAL INVOCATION IN FLORIDA
In the wake of the Davis decision, the status of an equivocal invo-
cation of Miranda rights in Florida is somewhat unclear. In Deck v.
State,163 the Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA) recently con-
templated that status. During interrogation regarding allegations of
sexual offenses against a minor, Deck responded, “I don’t know. I
can’t talk about it anymore.”164 The officers made no attempt to clar-
ify Deck’s desires, but continued their interrogation.165 After a suffi-
cient number of incriminating responses had been obtained, Deck
again made an ambiguous reference to terminating the session.166 The
interrogating officers then attempted to clarify the suspect’s desires,
at which point Deck confirmed his desire to terminate the interview.167
The Fifth DCA noted the conflict caused by the decision in
Davis.168 Although Davis altered the treatment of equivocal invoca-
tions of Fifth Amendment rights, it did not necessarily affect the
treatment afforded to invocation of state constitutional rights. The
court concluded that until the Florida Supreme Court reevaluated
its approach in light of Davis, Traylor remained binding.169 Although
                                                                                                                 
158. 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
159. See, e.g., Sadeghi, supra note 156, at 349.
160. See 384 U.S. at 455 (suggesting that it is naive to place blind trust in all police of-
ficers).
161. See Sadeghi, supra note 156, at 348-49 (arguing that police may now give inexact
readings of Miranda warnings without any reprisal).
162. See, e.g., Christo Lassiter, The Stop and Frisk of Criminal Street Gang Members, 14
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 47 n.169 (1995) (highlighting retired Los Angeles police detective Mark
Fuhrman as an example of the potential for corruption among law enforcement officers).
163. 653 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
164. Id. at 435.
165. See id. at 436.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. (“The answer to this question was readily apparent prior to the advent of
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States.”).
169. See id.
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Deck concerned the right to terminate interrogation and remain si-
lent, rather than the right to counsel, the same principles are appli-
cable.170 Accordingly, Florida law enforcement officers remain obli-
gated to clarify a suspect’s desires in response to an ambiguous ref-
erence to Miranda rights.
More recently, in Skyles v. State,171 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal (Fourth DCA) certified the issue to the Florida Supreme
Court as a question of great public importance.172 The Florida Su-
preme Court has granted discretionary review173 and will decide the
case without hearing oral argument.174 Cecil Skyles had been con-
victed of two counts of sexual battery on a person under twelve.175
Skyles, who was fourteen, had agreed to come to the police station
and had received his Miranda warnings.176 In response to question-
ing, he denied any wrongdoing.177 At one point in the interrogation,
he responded by saying, “I’m through man, that’s all I’m saying” and
“That’s all I have to say is [sic] ‘cause that’s all I know.”178 The offi-
cers continued the interrogation and ultimately obtained Skyles’
confession.179 The trial court admitted the confession into evidence
and Skyles was convicted.180 On appeal, the Fourth DCA reversed
and remanded for a new trial, concluding that Traylor governed
until the Florida Supreme Court reviewed its decision in light of
Davis.181
The Florida Supreme Court has granted discretionary review in
yet another case questioning the impact of Davis in Florida.182 In
State v. Owen (Owen II),183 the state requested the Fourth DCA to
reconsider Owen I in light of Davis.184 The Florida Supreme Court
had previously held that Owen’s “responses were, at the least, an
equivocal invocation of the Miranda right to terminate questioning,
which could only be clarified.”185 Prior to retrial, the state moved for
                                                                                                                 
170. See id.
171. 670 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 679 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1996).
172. See id. at 1085.
173. See State v. Skyles, 679 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1996).
174. See Telephone Interview with Sid White, Clerk of Court, Fla. Sup. Ct. (Jan. 27,
1997).
175. See Skyles v. State, 670 So. 2d at 1084.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 1084-85.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 1084.
181. See id. at 1086.
182. See 662 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1995).
183. 654 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 662 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1995). Owen I
set the precedent for the Florida Supreme Court’s treatment of equivocal invocation of Mi-
randa rights. For a review of the case’s facts, see supra text accompanying notes 113-120.
184. See Owen II, 654 So. 2d at 201.
185. Owen I, 560 So. 2d at 211.
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reconsideration in light of the Davis decision. The Fourth DCA de-
nied the request and certified the question to the Florida Supreme
Court.186 The supreme court granted review in October 1995187 and
heard oral argument in January 1996,188 but had yet to render its
decision at the time this Comment was being prepared for publica-
tion.189
The analyses of the district courts of appeal in Deck, Skyles, and
Owen II were undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless, the Florida Su-
preme Court should review its Miranda jurisprudence at the first
opportunity. This opportunity is available to the court in both Owen
II and Skyles. The court should affirm its earlier interpretation of
the article I, section 9 right to counsel and right against self-
incrimination in the Florida Constitution. Recognizing that it is free
to afford citizens greater rights under the Florida Constitution than
are provided by the U.S. Constitution, the court should continue its
practice of requiring law enforcement officers to clarify any ambigu-
ous reference to terminating interrogation or to counsel. Only the
clarification approach satisfies all competing interests. It preserves
the suspect’s right to terminate the interrogation while still provid-
ing a workable guideline for law enforcement officers.190 Both the
threshold standard of clarity approach adopted by the Davis Court
and the per se bar approach are flawed. Accordingly, the Florida
Supreme Court should answer the questions certified by the Fourth
DCA in Owen II and Skyles in the negative and hold that Traylor
continues to require interrogating officers to clarify ambiguous re-
quests for counsel notwithstanding Davis.
VI.   ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE TRAYLOR DECISION
By identifying an earlier point for the attachment of the right to
counsel under the Florida Constitution,191 the Traylor decision has
obvious ramifications for the conduct of law enforcement officers.
While there is no doubt that the Florida Supreme Court may inter-
pret the Florida Constitution in ways that provide broader rights to
its citizens than the U.S. Constitution, the Traylor holding presents
difficulties for effective law enforcement and investigation.
                                                                                                                 
186. See id. at 200.
187. See State v. Owen, 662 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1995).
188. See White, supra note 174.
189. Id.
190. This same approach was embraced by Justice Souter in his concurrence in Davis.
See 114 S. Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
191. See supra Part III.D.
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A.   DWI Testing
Many disputes involving the right to counsel are raised in driv-
ing-while-intoxicated (DWI) proceedings. Florida has an “implied
consent” statute that requires that motorists declining to submit to
chemical testing lose their driving privilege for one year.192 By oper-
ating a motor vehicle within the state, a person is deemed to have
granted consent to submit to blood, breath, or urine testing that is
designed to detect the presence of chemical substances.193 Florida’s
statute also provides that a motorist’s refusal to submit to testing is
admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding.194 While the
statute requires officers to advise motorists that refusal will result
in suspension of their driver’s licenses, it does not mandate disclo-
sure of the admissibility of the refusal as evidence of guilt.195
A number of courts have considered the relationship of chemical
testing to a suspect’s right against self-incrimination. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has addressed a similar issue and concluded that
chemical testing is merely physical evidence gathering and is not
testimonial in nature.196 Similarly, the Court has considered the
need for Miranda warnings in roadside stops prior to formal arrest
and has held that Miranda does not apply to such situations be-
cause they do not meet the requirements for custodial interroga-
tion.197 In the absence of custodial interrogation, an individual has
no Fifth Amendment right to consult with a lawyer before submit-
ting to the tests.198
Fewer courts have addressed the issue of chemical testing and
sobriety testing as it relates to the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel, however. Some courts have denied the right to counsel on the
basis that chemical testing pursuant to a motor vehicle stop is a civil
proceeding, rather than a criminal proceeding in which the right to
                                                                                                                 
192. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a) (Supp. 1996) (providing that “failure to submit to
any lawful test of his or her breath or urine, or both, will result in the suspension of the
person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of one year”).
193. See id. For a description of the technology associated with breathalyzer tests, see
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1984).
194. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a) (Supp. 1996).
195. See id.
196. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (concluding that a blood al-
cohol test is not testimonial in nature and does not violate a suspect’s right against self-
incrimination). Testimonial evidence is limited to that which would confront the suspect
with the “cruel trilemma” of silence, lying, or telling the truth. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz,
496 U.S. 582, 595-97 (1990).
197. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (holding that temporary traf-
fic stops do not constitute custody for Miranda purposes despite the fact that a citizen
likely would understand that he or she is not free to leave).
198. See id. at 442.
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counsel would apply.199 This analysis is flawed because the chemical
testing is inextricably intertwined with the criminal DWI prosecu-
tion.200 Usually, however, a defendant’s claim that sobriety testing
violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is summarily dis-
missed because the right cannot have attached when charges have
not yet been filed.201 Florida’s early attachment of the right to coun-
sel, announced in Traylor, complicates this analysis.
The typical procedure followed by Florida police after detaining
an individual suspected of DWI is to remove the person to a DWI in-
take station.202 There, the suspect is videotaped performing various
physical tests, and chemical testing is conducted.203 Because the per-
son has been arrested, the right to counsel has arguably attached
pursuant to Traylor. At this point, the person has been restrained,
and it is clearly feasible to provide counsel.204 The remaining step is
to determine whether chemical testing and videotaped sobriety
testing constitute “crucial stages” for purposes of the Florida right to
counsel.
In State v. Burns,205 the Fifth DCA considered whether a DWI
suspect has the right to counsel at a testing center.206 The DCA dis-
cussed the feasibility of providing counsel at the testing center.207
Admitting that the issue is a “nebulous gray area,” the court de-
clined to resolve the feasibility question.208 Instead, the court denied
the right to counsel because the scenario failed to constitute a
“crucial stage” or “crucial confrontation” within the meaning of Tray-
lor.209 The court rejected the defendant’s comparison of the chemical
                                                                                                                 
199. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 191 N.W.2d 188, 190-91 (Minn. 1971) (reasoning that
because chemical testing is civil in nature, “[t]he defendant . . . is not clothed with those
substantive constitutional rights associated with criminal matters”); Commonwealth Dep’t
of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Ingram, 648 A.2d 285, 294-95 (Pa. 1994)
(refusing to extend the right to counsel before chemical testing, but requiring that officers
inform the individual that his or her Miranda rights do not apply).
200. See Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991)
(allowing a limited right to counsel prior to chemical testing because it constitutes a
“crucial stage” in criminal proceedings).
201. See, e.g., Sites v. State, 481 A.2d 192, 196-97 (Md. 1984) (listing cases which have
addressed the issue).
202. See State v. Burns, 661 So. 2d 842, 845 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see also State v.
Hoch, 500 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
203. See Burns, 661 So. 2d at 845-46.
204. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 970.
205. 661 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
206. See id. at 847.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 848 (“[A]dministering a breathalyzer and having a defendant perform
the field sobriety test on videotape are really nothing more than the collection and preser-
vation of physical evidence, as is done in every type of case, and do not constitute a crucial
confrontation requiring the presence of defense counsel.”).
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testing with a physical lineup.210 Nevertheless, in light of Traylor’s
earlier attachment of the right to counsel, the administration of DWI
testing arguably meets the criteria for a crucial stage. Undoubtedly,
a DWI suspect’s decision whether to submit to testing will
“significantly affect the outcome,” as required by the Traylor test.211
In Traylor, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished a “crucial
stage”212 from a “critical stage,”213 implying that the two are indeed
different.214 Clearly, if the purpose of the Florida Constitution is to
provide broader rights than those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitu-
tion, a crucial stage must be interpreted as encompassing more
events than the U.S. Supreme Court’s critical stage.215 Because the
right to counsel has attached under the Traylor standard and the
results of chemical testing will undoubtedly have a significant effect
on the outcome, the motorist should be entitled to consult with an
attorney before making the decision to consent to testing.
Other jurisdictions have adopted policies that permit consultation
with a lawyer before testing.216 A minority of states permit a limited
right to consult with counsel in such situations.217 This consultation
right reduces motorist confusion, a common by-product of the im-
plied consent statutes.218
Other courts have held that DWI testing constitutes a critical
stage for purposes of their state constitutions but not for the U.S.
Constitution.219 Still other courts have found the Sixth Amendment
                                                                                                                 
210. See id. Post-indictment lineups have been deemed to be critical stages requiring
the presence of counsel because they are riddled with the danger of unreliable identifica-
tion and cannot be effectively questioned at trial without counsel’s presence to note prob-
lems. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). The Wade Court differentiated
lineups from purely physical tests such as blood tests. See id. (“[T]here is minimal risk
that his counsel’s absence at such stages might derogate from his right to a fair trial.”); cf.
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does
not require the presence of counsel at a post-indictment photographic identification be-
cause the defendant is not present and confronted by his or her professional adversary).
211. 596 So. 2d at 968.
212. The Traylor court identified a crucial stage as “any stage that may significantly
affect the outcome of the proceedings.” Id.
213. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applies to each “critical stage” of the prosecution. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 237.
214. See 596 So. 2d at 968 n.24.
215. See id. at 970.
216. See Louis W. Schack, Motorist Confusion: The Unfortunate By-Product of Pennsyl-
vania’s Implied Consent Law, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 931, 949 (1994).
217. See, e.g., Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Alaska 1983); Parsons v. Com-
missioner of Pub. Safety, 488 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Bickler v. North Da-
kota State Highway Comm’r, 423 N.W.2d 146, 147 (N.D. 1988); Siegwald v. Curry, 319
N.E.2d 381, 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); State v. George, 640 A.2d 26, 27 (Vt. 1994).
218. See Schack, supra note 216, at 948. This limited right permits the motorist a rea-
sonable time to consult an attorney by telephone. See id. The right does not guarantee ac-
tual consultation. See id.
219. See John R. Tunheim, Criminal Justice: Expanded Protections Under the Minne-
sota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 465, 485-86 (1994); see also Nyflot v. Minne-
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right to counsel does extend to this stage.220 Despite this inconsis-
tency, the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to address the issue.221
States that have found a state constitutional right to consult with
counsel before consenting to chemical testing include New York,222
Minnesota,223 and Oregon.224 Most states that have denied this right
have done so based upon a rationale that the right to counsel had
not yet attached.225 In light of Traylor, Florida courts are unable to
use that same justification.
B.   Undercover Jailhouse Informants
Another area of law enforcement that is complicated by Florida’s
early attachment of the right to counsel is the common practice of
eliciting incriminating statements through undercover informants.
In Illinois v. Perkins ,226 the U.S. Supreme Court held that because
the use of undercover informants does not result in the inherently
coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings
are inapplicable.227 The Court explained:
Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not
implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. The essential ingredi-
ents of a “police-dominated atmosphere” and compulsion are not
present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone
whom he believes to be a fellow inmate. Coercion is determined
from the perspective of the suspect. When a suspect considers him-
self in the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive at-
mosphere is lacking.228
                                                                                                                 
sota Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 474 U.S. 1027, 1030 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court should not have dismissed the appeal where lower courts have divided over
the availability of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel before consenting to chemical
testing).
220. See, e.g., Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646, 654 (D.S.D. 1982), vacated as
moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982); State v. Welch, 376 A.2d 351, 355 (Vt. 1977).
221. See Nyflat, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985) (dismissing the appeal for want of a substantial
federal question).
222. See People v. Gursey, 239 N.E.2d 351, 353 (N.Y. 1968) (allowing consultation with
an attorney prior to breath analysis provided that the delay does not “palpably impair” the
statutory procedure for testing).
223. See Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 1991)
(requiring a limited right to counsel on state constitutional grounds).
224. See State v. Spencer, 750 P.2d 147, 156 (Or. 1988) (holding that a driver has a
right to consult an attorney prior to breath analysis, but the state need not wait a long
period of time).
225. See Sites v. State, 481 A.2d 192, 196-97 (Md. 1984) (finding the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had not yet attached and citing cases); see also Tunheim, supra note 219,
at 483-84 (noting Minnesota’s rationale for attachment).
226. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
227. See id. at 296-97.
228. Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
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The defendant in Perkins had attempted to avail himself of his
Fifth Amendment protections, arguing that he had not been advised
of his Miranda rights before the undercover interrogation.229 In the
absence of custodial interrogation, however, the Court ruled that
Miranda was inapplicable.230 The Court also addressed the defen-
dant’s claim of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, dismissing this
argument because no charges had yet been filed on the subject of the
interrogation.231 Because judicial criminal proceedings had not been
initiated, no Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. In dic-
tum, however, the Court explained that “the government may not
use an undercover agent to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel once a suspect has been charged with the crime.”232
Florida’s early attachment of the right to counsel creates prob-
lems in the context of undercover interrogation. Because the right
attaches as soon as feasible after first restraint, any attempt to util-
ize undercover agents would unconstitutionally circumvent the Sixth
Amendment, in violation of Perkins.
VII.   CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court’s right-to-counsel jurisprudence has
become complicated by recent events. The court, in its attempt to
guarantee broader rights under the Florida Constitution than are
guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution, has endangered several
common methods of law enforcement. The court should reevaluate
its current stance at the earliest opportunity. This opportunity was
recently available to the court in its discretionary review of Owen
II.233 Though the court has not yet rendered its opinion in Owen II,
the opportunity to review this issue also is available in Skyles.234 The
Florida Supreme Court should answer the questions certified by the
Fourth DCA in both Owen II and Skyles in the negative, explaining
that Traylor continues to require the clarification approach in Flor-
ida not withstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Davis.
                                                                                                                 
229. See id. at 294.
230. See id. at 296.
231. See id. at 299.
232. Id.; see also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176-80 (1985) (holding that the State
violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by arranging a recording of a
conversation between the defendant and a co-defendant who was a government informant);
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1980) (holding that statements made by the
defendant to a paid informant, while in jail, were “deliberately elicited” and an inadmissi-
ble violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (finding a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel where the government obtained a confession secretly by recording a conversation be-
tween the defendant and co-defendant by placing a radio transmitter in the co-defendant’s
ear).
233. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
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With regard to ambiguous requests invoking Miranda rights, the
court should reaffirm its pre-Davis holding and require that  inter-
rogating investigators clarify the desires of the suspect before con-
tinuing with their interrogation. Only the clarification approach ac-
complishes the goals of both fairness and practicality. With respect
to the earlier point of attachment for the right to counsel under the
Florida Constitution, the court should abandon the notion that the
right to counsel attaches as soon as feasible after restraint. Such a
provision unduly interferes with legitimate, longstanding law en-
forcement practices. Rather, the court should settle on first appear-
ance235 as the point of attachment of the right to counsel. The pro-
tections afforded to defendants by adherence to Miranda and insis-
tence upon the clarification of ambiguous invocation of rights will
continue to sufficiently protect against any danger of coercion.
Choosing first appearance as the point of attachment for the Florida
Constitution’s article I, section 16 right to counsel provides greater
protection than is provided by the U.S. Constitution. Selection of
first appearance satisfies the court’s desire to expand the rights
granted to citizens under the state constitution, while maintaining
the effectiveness of law enforcement.
                                                                                                                 
235. See supra note 85.
